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NOTE
DIVORCEES TURN ABOUT IN THEIR GRAVES AS
Ex-SPOUSES CASH IN: CODIFIED CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS ENSURE AN EQUITABLE RESULT REGARDING
ERISA-GOVERNED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Sarabeth A. Rayho*
A revocation-by-divorce statute essentially nullifies a devise in a
divorced decedent's will when the devise bequeaths property to the
decedent's ex-spouse and the will was executed during their
marriage. Until recently, state revocation-by-divorce statutes
unquestionably applied not only to wills but also to will substitutes,
including ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. In 2001, the
Supreme Court held in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner that
ERISA preempts traditional state revocation-by-divorce statutes as
applied to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. In the wake of
the Egelhoff decision, plan administrators may automatically pay
proceeds to the listed beneficiary, even an ex-spouse, regardless of
the existence of a traditional state revocation-by-divorce statute. One
solution to this preemption is the use of a constructive trust. Uniform
Probate Code section 2-804(h)(2) imposes a constructive trust
against an ex-spouse when the ex-spouse receives proceeds from an
employee benefit plan because ERISA preempts a state revocation-
by-divorce statute. The constructive trust is in favor of those persons
who would take if the corresponding state revocation-by-divorce law
were not preempted. This Note argues that state statutory
constructive trusts adopting Uniform Probate Code section
2-804(h)(2) can resurrect the revocation-by-divorce doctrine as
applied to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. In doing so,
constructive trusts would achieve an equitable result consistent with
the law's treatment of other will substitutes as well as wills
themselves. The Note begins by discussing the revocation-by-divorce
doctrine and ERISA jurisprudence and explains how ERISA
intertwines with traditional revocation-by-divorce statutes. The Note
then reviews currently suggested methods to harmonize ERISA-
governed employee benefit plans with the treatment of other will
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well as the Michigan Law Review Notes Office for valuable editorial guidance.
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substitutes and contends that those proposals are inadequate because
they undermine ERISA's goals. The Note concludes that state
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INTRODUCTION
When Harry met Sally, they fell in love and were married soon thereafter.
Because he loved her, Harry named Sally as the primary beneficiary under his
will, his life insurance policy, and his employee pension plan. After several
years, however, the love was lost: Harry and Sally divorced, based in part on
Sally's extramarital affair with Russell. In the divorce proceedings, both Harry
and Sally individually acquired their respective shares of marital property.
Dividing the assets, the divorce court saw fit to award Harry his own life in-
surance policy and employee pension plan. Harry succumbed to heart failure
shortly after the divorce, leaving several heirs at his death, including his
brothers and sisters. As it was, Harry died before getting around to changing
the beneficiary designations on his insurance policy and employee pension
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plan, so both still listed Sally as the primary beneficiary at the time of Harry's
death. In the end, it appears Sally receives not only her fair share of property
from the divorce but also some assets the divorce court saw fit to award Harry.
Sally and her new husband, Russell, deposit Harry's assets in their joint bank
account, and Harry's heirs walk away empty-handed.
Given the high divorce rate in the United States,' decedents frequently
pass away leaving wills and other documents designating an ex-spouse as a
beneficiary of property.2 Married couples typically provide that their spouses
are the primary beneficiaries in wills and other instruments covering personal
property. When a couple obtains a divorce, it is in the interest of each divorcee
to update his or her documents accordingly. Unfortunately, some divorcees
neglect to change beneficiary designations before it is too late. These indi-
viduals pass away with wills and other instruments still listing their former
spouses as beneficiaries. In these circumstances, courts have been forced to
decide whether to enforce beneficiary designations.
Applying what is known as the revocation-by-divorce doctrine, courts
have long held that when a divorced decedent's will was executed during his
marriage and the will devises property to his ex-spouse, the devise is essen-
tially nullified.3 Unless the testator's actions after his divorce manifested a
clear intent to devise property to his ex-spouse, the ex-spouse will not receive
the devised property from the decedent's estate.4 Wills, however, govern only
the probate estate-"property owned by the decedent at death and property
acquired by the decedent's estate at or after the decedent's death."5 In addition
to probate property, an increasing number of individuals distribute consider-
able nonprobate assets at death through the use of will substitutes6 such as life
I. Provisional data from 2006 show a divorce rate of 3.6 per 1000 population. Nat'l Ctr. for
Health Stat., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths:
Provisional Data for 2006, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Aug. 28, 2007, at 1, tbl. A, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55-20.pdf (collating data from forty-four reporting
states and the District of Columbia).
2. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (involving a decedent
who failed to change his beneficiary designation from his ex-wife to his children prior to his death);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. ex rel. GM Life & Disability Benefits Program, 892 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa.
1995) (involving a decedent who was married to his surviving spouse for over thirty years but failed
to change the beneficiary designation from his ex-wife to his widow); Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d
721 (Tex. 2003) (involving a decedent who failed to change his beneficiary designation from his ex-
wife to his widow).
3. See Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 590 A.2d 1161, 1164 (N.J. 1991).
4. Richards v. Liles, 435 A.2d 379, 382 (D.C. 1981) ("[I]t is so rare and so unusual for a
testator... to desire or intend that his divorced spouse should benefit further under his will, that it is
not improper or unreasonable to require that such a testator make that extraordinary desire and in-
tention manifest by a formal republication of his will or by the execution of a new will." (citing
Caswell v. Kent, 186 A.2d 581, 582-83 (Me. 1962))).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1(a)
(1999).
6. Will "substitutes" are so named because "[t]hey function to pass property at death
without being subject to the statutory formalities required for executing a will." LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 8-1 (4th ed. 2006).
The Restatement defines will substitutes as follows:
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insurance policies and employee pension plans governed by contract terms
listing beneficiaries! In 1990, recognizing the importance of will substitutes,
section 2-804 of the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") extended the revocation-
by-divorce doctrine to cover both wills and will substitutes!
Until recently, state revocation-by-divorce statutes like UPC section
2-804 unquestionably applied to all will substitutes. However, in 2001, the
Supreme Court held in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex reL Breiner that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") preempts traditional state revoca-
tion-by-divorce statutes as applied to ERISA-governed employee benefit
plans.9 The Court's ruling created a rift between the treatment of employee
benefit plan beneficiary designations and the treatment of beneficiary designa-
tions in wills and all other will substitutes. In the wake of the Egelhoff
decision, plan administrators 0 may automatically pay proceeds to the listed
beneficiary, even an ex-spouse, regardless of the existence of a traditional state
revocation-by-divorce statute. Revocation-by-divorce statutes remain applica-
ble to wills and will substitutes other than ERISA-governed employee benefit
A will substitute is an arrangement respecting property or contract rights that is established
during the donor's life, under which (1) the right to possession or enjoyment of the property
or to a contractual payment shifts outside of probate to the donee at the donor's death; and
(2) substantial lifetime rights of dominion, control, possession, or enjoyment are retained by
the donor.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1(a) (2003).
7. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Un-
der the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IowA L. REV. 223, 226 (1991).
8. Waggoner, supra note 7, at 228. The relevant portion of UPC section 2-804 reads as
follows:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a con-
tract relating to the division of the marital estate .... the divorce or annulment of a
marriage:
(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced in-
dividual to his [or her] former spouse in a governing instrument ....
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 2007).
9. 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001).
10. ERISA defines "administrator" as follows:
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the
plan is operated;
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor
cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2000).
ERISA defines "plan sponsor" as follows:
(i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit plan established or maintained by a single
employer, (ii) the employee organization in the case of a plan established or maintained by an
employee organization, or (iii) in the case of a plan established or maintained by two or more
employers or jointly by one or more employers and one or more employee organizations, the
association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the
parties who establish or maintain the plan.
Id. § 1002(16)(B).
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plans." Given the policy rationale behind the revocation-by-divorce doc-
trine-that divorcees do not intend for ex-spouses to receive additional
benefits at the divorcees' deaths, especially because any obligation to the ex-
spouse was satisfied in the divorce proceeding-the Court's decision may
enable unjust enrichment of the ex-spouse through receipt of proceeds from
the decedent's employee benefit plans. 2
Courts have used the longstanding constructive trust doctrine to prevent
similar kinds of unjust enrichment. 3 The doctrine affords courts the opportu-
nity to give effect to the law that applies to the circumstances before them
"but use equity to ensure that the property goes where equity directs."'' 4 The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains:
A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property usually subject-
ing the person by whom the title is held to an equitable duty to convey the
property to another on the ground that the title holder's acquisition or reten-
tion of the property is wrongful and that unjust enrichment would occur if
the title holder were permitted to retain the property."
Traditionally, courts imposed constructive trusts in situations involving
mistake, duress, undue influence, fraud, or breach of a confidential or fiduci-
ary relationship. 6 Nonetheless, over time these requirements have coalesced
into the general concept of "unjust enrichment."'7 Today "there are numerous
situations in which a constructive trust is imposed in the absence of fraud, as
for example in the case of... an innocent donee of property in which another
has an equitable interest."' 8 Courts can use constructive trusts in a variety of
situations, and judges have used the doctrine in the probate context.' 9 In fact,
11. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 60.
12. Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-On-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83, 120 (2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1, cmt. e (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. d (1937) ("In most cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result is
to restore to the plaintiff property of which he has been unjustly deprived and to take from the de-
fendant property the retention of which by him would result in a corresponding unjust enrichment of
the defendant....").
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §§ 166, 168.
17. Id. § 160, cmt. d; see also Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance: Post Mor-
ten Renedies for Breach of a Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 Mo. L.
REV. 533, 569 n. 119 (1996) (explaining that "Itlhis formulation has been widely adopted" and pro-
viding a list of case law discussing the formulation).
18. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 462
(4th ed. 1989); see also Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club, 265 F2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1959)
("[A] constructive trust may arise against one who has been unjustly enriched even though he has
been guilty of no act of wrongdoing."); Smithberg v. Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 735 N.E.2d 560, 565 (I1.
2000) ("Although some form of wrongdoing is generally required for the imposition of a construc-
tive trust, wrongdoing is not always a necessary element." (citations omitted)).
19. See In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993) (holding that although the testator
ineffectively revoked a codicil to a will, a constructive trust should be imposed to effect the same
result as if the testator indeed legitimately revoked the codicil).
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"the most common use of constructive trust is to restore ownership of prop-
erty in disputes within families." 20
The constructive trust doctrine is historically a judicial remedy.' Never-
theless, the drafters of the current UPC codified the constructive trust doctrine
to apply if its revocation-by-divorce provision were to be preempted by fed-22
eral law. Section 2-804(h)(2) of the UPC provides as follows:
If... any part of this section [2-804] is preempted by federal law with re-
spect to... any... benefit covered by this section, a former spouse... who,
not for value, received a payment.., to which that person is not entitled un-
der this section is obligated to return that payment ... to the person who
would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not
preempted.2
If an ex-spouse receives proceeds from an employee benefit plan because
ERISA preempts a state revocation-by-divorce statute such as UPC section 2-
804(b), section 2-804(h)(2) mandates that a constructive trust be imposed
against the ex-spouse in favor of those persons who would take if the corre-
sponding state law were not preempted. 24 Several states have adopted statutes
similar or identical to section 2-804(h)(2).25 As yet, no one has tested any of
these statutes in the courts.26
This Note defends the thesis that state statutory constructive trusts can
resurrect the revocation-by-divorce doctrine as applied to ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans in order to reach an equitable result consistent with the
law's treatment of other will substitutes as well as wills themselves. Part I
discusses the revocation-by-divorce doctrine and ERISA jurisprudence and
explains how ERISA intertwines with traditional revocation-by-divorce stat-
utes. Part II reviews currently suggested methods to harmonize ERISA-
governed employee benefit plans with the treatment of other will substitutes
20. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 594 (3d ed. 2002). Professor
Laycock cites two cases for this assertion: Herston v. Austin, 603 So. 2d 976 (Ala. 1992), where the
court imposed a constructive trust against a son in favor of his mother, and Baizley v. Baizley, 734
A.2d 1117 (Me. 1999), where the court imposed a constructive trust against a grandson forcing him
to share property with the decedent's other grandchildren.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1, cmt. e (2003) ("A constructive trust is ... the
result of judicial intervention and is remedial in character.").
22. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 2007).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For a state statute similar to UPC section 2-804(h)(2), see Asoz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14
2804(H) (2005), which imposes a constructive trust but does not expressly reference the possibility
of federal preemption. For examples of state statutes identical to UPC section 2-804(h)(2), see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-804(8)(b) (2006); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.2809(2) (West 2002);
N.M. STAT. § 45-2-804(l) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-804(h)(2) (2004); and UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-804(8)(b) (Supp. 2006). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-11 1.1(D) (Supp. 2007) (using
nearly identical language as applied to "death benefits"). For a state statute drafted to avoid the issue
altogether, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-814(8)(b) (2005), which imposes a constructive trust in
circumstances pertaining to preemption by any federal law other than ERISA.
26. Gary, supra note 12, at 124. A recent Westlaw Keycite of state statutes that adopt UPC
section 2-804 confirms this assertion.
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and contends that those proposals inadequately address the issue because they
undermine ERISA's goals, including nationwide uniformity and protection of
plan participants. Finally, Part III argues that courts can successfully apply
statutory constructive trusts to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans in
order to effectuate close to the same result as traditional revocation-by-divorce
statutes, because state constructive trust statutes will likely avoid ERISA pre-
emption. Part III concludes that use of the constructive trust doctrine is a more
desirable solution than other suggested methods because it ensures the
achievement of ERISA's goals regarding efficient plan administration while
also honoring the principle and intent behind the revocation-by-divorce doc-
trine.27
I. TRADITIONAL REVOCATION-BY-DIVORCE STATUTES AND ERISA
This Part explores the complex law surrounding will substitutes, the revo-
cation-by-divorce doctrine, and ERISA. Section L.A explains the development
of the revocation-by-divorce doctrine. Section I.B describes the goals of
ERISA and how revocation-by-divorce statutes intertwine with ERISA's pro-
visions.
A. The Revocation-by-Divorce Doctrine:
Protecting Divorced Decedents' Presumed Intent
This Section provides background on the revocation-by-divorce doctrine.
The revocation-by-divorce doctrine developed as an expression of presumed
testamentary intent and assumes that most divorced testators would prefer that
an ex-spouse be denied property devised under a will executed before the
28
couple divorced. The rule "presumes that in most instances, if a devise made
to an ex-spouse is left unchanged, it is because the testator either forgot to
revoke the devise, or did not get around to doing so before his or her death. 29
27. This Note will not address the issues arising when an ex-spouse purportedly "waived"
rights to a pension plan under a marital property settlement agreement when divorcing the deceased
or discuss the merits of the "waiver" doctrine. See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir.
2000) (stating that under federal common law, a waiver is valid if, "upon reading the language in the
divorce decree, a reasonable person would have understood that she was waiving her beneficiary
interest"); see also George A. Norwood, Who Is Entitled to Receive a Deceased Participant's ERISA
Retirement Plan Benefits-an Ex-Spouse or Current Spouse? The Federal Circuits Have an Irrecon-
cilable Conflict, 33 GONz. L. REV. 61 (1997) (exploring various approaches taken by courts and
concluding plan administrators must distribute to the beneficiary listed on the plan documents in-
stead of investigating possible "waivers" contained in agreements executed upon divorce of a plan
participant).
This Note addresses solely the circumstances when an individual is awarded his own ERISA-
governed plan in a property settlement agreement executed upon divorce (that is, the parties do not
use a qualified domestic relations order as contemplated by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2000)), but
the individual fails to change the beneficiary designation from his ex-spouse after the divorce decree
is entered. Thus when the individual dies, his ex-spouse remains the listed beneficiary of the plan
proceeds.
28. Gary, supra note 12, at 84.
29. David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law for ERISA-
Preempted Beneficiary Designations, J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, Fall 2002, at 29, 34.
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If the testator does wish to devise property to his ex-spouse, he must go
through an additional step manifesting such intent, for example, republishing
his will or executing a new will.
30
Many states have codified the revocation-by-divorce doctrine in some
form.3 Instead of revoking the entire will, these statutes typically invalidate
only the devise favoring the ex-spouse. 32 Most state revocation-by-divorce
statutes regarding wills are based on the former UPC section 2-508, 33 which
cancels any provision for the ex-spouse contained in the decedent's will by
treating the ex-spouse as if she predeceased the testator and giving effect to
any alternative provisions in the will.34 If no alternate provisions exist, then the
property is disposed of as if the decedent died intestate.35
Many individuals use will substitutes to manage their property distribution
at death, which led some academics to call for expansion of the revocation-by-
divorce doctrine to cover will substitutes.36 In response to this "nonprobate
revolution," the drafters of the current Uniform Probate Code promulgated
UPC section 2-804, applying the revocation-by-divorce doctrine to all will
substitutes.37 The drafters of the current UPC were clear that they wished to
30. Gary, supra note 12, at 84. Under the UPC, an ex-spouse can rebut the presumption of
the revocation-by-divorce doctrine if provided by "the express terms of a governing instrument, a
court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced
individuals" before or after the divorce. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A.
60 (Supp. 2007).
31. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6122 (West Supp.
2007); FLA. STAT. § 732.507(2) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-49 (1997); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.
35/1 (2006); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-8 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.271 (West Supp. 2006); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (2005); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1608 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.90
(West 2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 114 (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 854.15 (West 2001).
32. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-6 (LexisNexis 2004).
33. Gary, supra note 12, at 85. There is slight variation among the statutes. For statutes that
do not indicate that the will should be interpreted as if the ex-spouse predeceased the testator, see,
for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-8; IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.271;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-610; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1608; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (2005); PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6111.1 (West 2005); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.266. For statutes that limit
revocation to bequests, powers of appointment, and appointment as fiduciary, see, for example,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45A-257c (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 209 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-508 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2333 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(11) (2007);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney Supp. 2007); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.33 (LexisNexis 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-202 (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-6
(LexisNexis 2004); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-118 (2007).
34. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 122 (1983).
35. See id.
36. E.g., John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Suc-
cession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1136-37 (1984) ("The subsidiary rules [of wills] are the product of
centuries of legal experience in attempting to discern transferors' wishes and suppress litigation.
These rules should be treated as presumptively correct for will substitutes as well as for wills.").
37. Waggoner, supra note 7, at 228. The relevant portion of UPC section 2-804 reads as
follows:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract
relating to the division of the marital estate .... the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
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unify the rules applicable to wills and will substitutes." Hence, unless other-
wise provided in a "governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating
to the division of the marital estate,' 3 9 the current UPC revokes any provisions
in the decedent's will in favor of the ex-spouse as well as any similar provi-
sions in the decedent's retirement plan, life insurance policy, or other will
substitute.4 0 Like the rationale for applying the revocation-by-divorce doctrine
to wills, the UPC provision assumes a decedent would not want his nonpro-
bate property to go to an ex-spouse.4 1 UPC section 2-804 was "the most
comprehensive measure of its kind" at the time.42
Today, a growing number of states extend the revocation-by-divorce doc-
trine to cover will substitutes. 43 The Restatement (Third) of Property also
applies revocation-by-divorce principles to will substitutes." Some state stat-
utes extending the revocation-by-divorce doctrine to include instruments other
than wills even predate the current UPC and represent a "patchwork" of pro-
visions that treat a decedent's property inconsistently from state to state.45
However, most state revocation-by-divorce statutes that extend to will substi-
tutes are similar or identical to the current UPC.
46
(I) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced indi-
vidual to his [or her] former spouse in a governing instmment ....
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 2007).
38. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt.
39. Id. § 2-804(b).
40. Waggoner, supra note 7, at 228.
41. Gary, supra note 12, at 84.
42. Waggoner, supra note 7, at 227.
43. Gary, supra note 12, at 84.
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. p
(1999).
45. Gary, supra note 12, at 100-01.
46. For statutes similar to the UPC, see, for example, 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-814 (2005) (extending revocation-by-divorce law to all will substitutes,
except when preempted by ERISA); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-14 (West 1983 & Supp. 2007); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-04 (1996 & Supp. 2005) (extending revocation-by-divorce law to all will
substitutes, except when preempted by ERISA); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33 (LexisNexis
2002); and WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010 (2006) (amended 2007). For statutes identical to the
UPC, see, for example, ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.804 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2804
(2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-804(2)(a) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-804 (Supp. 2005);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.2807-09 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-804 (1995); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 29A-2-804 (2004); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-804 (1993 & Supp. 2006).
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B. ERISA: Protecting Plan Participants'Interests
ERISA governs employee benefit plans, 47 which are a form of will substi-
tute. Thus ERISA may govern employer-provided will substitutes such as
pension plans, annuities, and insurance benefits. 48 These plans allow a partici-
pant to choose a beneficiary to receive some or all of the participant's vested
benefit upon the participant's death.49 They usually "allow a participant to
name a primary beneficiary and a contingent beneficiary (in case the primary
beneficiary dies before the participant). Moreover, they allow the participant
to designate new beneficiaries at any time, with the new beneficiary designa-
tion replacing the previous designation on file with the plan administrator."5°
The goal of ERISA is to protect the interests of employees and their bene-
ficiaries, in part by striving to ensure ease of plan administration. By
enacting ERISA, Congress intended to create a national, uniform administra-
tion of employee benefit plans.53 In order to develop such a uniform
administration system, ERISA broadly preempts any state laws insofar as they
"relate to" an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.54 The broad
preemption provision manifests Congress's intent to have federal law, not
state law, govern employee benefit plans.' 5
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000). ERISA defines "employee pension benefit plan" as follows:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express
terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
Id. § 1002(2)(A). The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that ERISA plans "cover approxi-
mately 150 million workers and their dependents and include assets of approximately $4.8
trillion." EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EBSA ACHIEVES TOTAL
MONETARY RESULTS EXCEEDING $1.4 BILLION (2007), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/
fsFY06Results.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
48. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (4th
ed. 2006).
49. Norwood, supra note 27, at 62.
50. Id.
51. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 77-87.
52. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2001) (noting that bur-
dening plan administrators creates "burdens ultimately home by the beneficiaries").
53. See id. at 148.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (explaining that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by the stat-
ute]").
55. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) ("[Tihe preemption of the field,
... round[s] out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent State and local regulation ....").
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Although most of the state statutes extending the revocation-by-divorce
doctrine to nonprobate property are worded broadly enough to cover benefici-
ary designations for ERISA-governed assets, such statutes do not exclusively
target such assets. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that these statutes are
unenforceable against ERISA plans.56 ERISA does not specifically address the
revocation-by-divorce doctrine. State statutes cannot revoke beneficiary des-
ignations of employee benefit plans covered by ERISA because such state
statutes are preempted under ERISA's broad "relate to" preemption provi-
sion.57 Therefore, a court cannot directly apply traditional revocation-by-
divorce statutes to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.58 The Egelhoff
majority reasoned there would be too much of a burden on plan administrators
if they could not rely on the plan documents to determine the beneficiary enti-
tled to the plan proceeds and instead were forced to learn the laws of all fifty
states on the subject.59 To allow otherwise, the Court asserted, would interfere
with ERISA's goal of efficient, nationally uniform plan administration.
60
Egelhoff leaves states uncertain how to construct statutes that "facilitate
the fair and orderly distribution of property at death and effectuate a dece-
dent's intent to the extent possible." 6' Egelhoff presents a potential barrier to
the unification of the state law of probate and nonprobate transfers, threaten-
ing those state laws-already endorsed in the Restatements and in the current
UPC-that treat ERISA-governed beneficiary designation documents the
62
same as all other will substitutes. Ultimately, "[t]he courts ... seem to be
caught between the uniformity goal of preemption and the desire to reach just
results, which in the field of donative transfers involves honoring the donor's
,,63
intentions.
II. CURRENTLY SUGGESTED METHODS Do NOT ADEQUATELY
HARMONIZE ERISA-GOVERNED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
WITH THE TREATMENT OF OTHER WILL SUBSTITUTES
In response to Egelhoff, courts and commentators tried to develop various
methods to remain true to its holding yet also honor traditional revocation-by-
divorce principles as applied to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. This
Part concludes such attempts have not been successful. Section IL.A argues
that although some courts have turned to federal common law regarding the
revocation-by-divorce doctrine, judges have not uniformly applied it, thus
frustrating ERISA's central concerns regarding ease of plan administration.
56. See Gary, supra note 12, at 109.
57. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 148-49.
60. See id. at 149.
61. Gary, supra note 12, at 113.
62. See T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 189 (2004).
63. Lebolt, supra note 29, at 31.
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Section II.B explores the possibility of congressional amendment of ERISA,
concluding that Congress is not receptive to ERISA reform efforts. Finally,
Section II.C examines the possibility that employers themselves could change
the plan documents but argues that the likelihood of successfully altering the
habits and forms of so many U.S. employers is extremely low.
A. Federal Common Law: Reincarnating State
Law Thwarts ERISA's Goals
After Egelhoff ruled that state revocation-by-divorce statutes did not apply
to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans, federal courts were left with little
guidance as to what law to apply instead.64 Some courts chose to fill the gap
by relying on federal common law. 6' This Section argues, however, that fed-
eral common law has become an unworkable solution, because the lack of
nationwide uniformity in its application is in direct conflict with ERISA's
goals and the Egelhoff ruling.
Federal common law is a purportedly uniform body of law applied by
federal courts in matters of uniquely federal concern. 66 Courts using federal
common law assert, in conformity with the Egelhoff reasoning, that "applying
federal common law promotes national uniformity" in the administration of
67ERISA-governed employee benefit plans. In contrast, applying individual
state revocation-by-divorce statutes requires plan administrators to be familiar
with multiple state laws, thus interfering with ERISA's goal of nationally uni-
form plan administration.65
In general, however, the application of federal common law presents prob-
lems. First, as the Egelhoff Court itself noted, family law matters are
traditionally left to the states and are therefore inappropriate subjects for fed-69
eral law. Normally, "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife.., belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States."70 Thus the creation of federal common law on this subject is funda-
mentally at odds with a basic role of the states, although Egelhoff did clarify
64. As stated in Manning v. Hayes, 212 E3d 866 (5th Cir. 2000), because Egeihoff held that
state revocation-by-divorce statutes are preempted by ERISA, "[tihe more difficult issue is whether,
having established that the state law is preempted, the federal law governing the resolution of this
and similar cases may be reasonably drawn from the text of ERISA itself, or must instead be devel-
oped as a matter of federal common law." Id. at 870.
65. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying federal
common law regarding "substantial compliance" in executing a change of beneficiary form); Keen
v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003) (applying federal common law regarding an ex-spouse's
"waiver" of interest in a decedent's ERISA-govemed employee benefit plan).
66. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting federal common law is cre-
ated when a federal rule of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests" or when
"Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law").
67. Keen, 121 S.W.3d at 726.
68. Id. at 725-26 (citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141,148-49 (2001)).
69. Egeihoff, 532 U.S. at 151.
70. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
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that ERISA should preempt conflicting state family law.] Second, federal
common law should be created sparingly.72 "There long has been a strong pre-
sumption against the federal courts fashioning common law to decide cases,"
because the Rules of Decision Act in the Judiciary Act of 1789 "seems to
deny the existence of federal common law" and "commands that in the ab-
sence of positive federal law, federal courts must apply state law.' 73 But
federal common law has developed nevertheless for issues relating to distinc-
tive federal interests for which the "interstate or international nature of the
controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control. 74
While courts have tried to use federal common law to achieve the same ef-
fect as the traditional revocation-by-divorce doctrine,75 they have failed to
employ it consistently 6 As one court noted, "to ensure uniformity in ERISA
jurisprudence ... federal common law should be consistent. '77 If federal
common law were consistent regarding revocation-by-divorce principles,
Egelhoff s ease-of-administration concerns would be alleviated.71 Yet federal
common law on this subject is not uniform, because different states and cir-
cuits have their own versions of federal common law. 79 For this reason, ERISA
plan administrators are "faced with the daunting task of interpreting federal
common law, state case law, and even state statutes when determining the
proper beneficiary" of an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan after the
divorce and death of the plan participant.80 In the absence of congressional
guidance, a federal court can look to the law of the state in which it sits in
71. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151; see also Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended for the courts, borrowing from state law where appropriate, and
guided by the policies expressed in ERISA and other federal labor laws, to fashion a body of federal
common law to govern ERISA suits.").
72. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,87 (1994).
73. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6. 1, at 354 (4th ed. 2003).
74. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
75. For example, courts have developed federal common law with respect to waiver. See,
e.g., Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2000). For a brief discussion of various courts'
treatment of waiver, see Suzanne Soliman, Note, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce
Revocation Statute for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, 36 STETSON L. REv. 397, 408
(2007). Soliman points out that "several states have taken the position that a property settlement
agreement incorporated into a dissolution decree may revoke a beneficiary's claim to any policy or
benefit held in an ex-spouse's name." Id. She notes, however, that "most jurisdictions have estab-
lished that a release in a property settlement agreement is not sufficient to override specific language
designating an ex-spouse as a beneficiary." Id.
76. Gary, supra note 12, at 119.
77. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2002).
78. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2001).
79. See Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Tex. 2003) (acknowledging a court split in
Texas regarding an ex-spouse's "waiver" of interest in a decedent's ERISA-govemed plan: one court
of appeals adopted a state statute as federal common law and the other appellate court refused to
incorporate state law as federal common law); see also Norwood, supra note 27, at 81-82 (explain-
ing irreconcilable differences in decisions across circuits and among states with respect to the
federal common law regarding an ex-spouse's "waiver" of interest in an ERISA-governed plan).
80. Norwood, supra note 27, at 8 1.
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order to form federal common law governing ERISA,"' so long as it does not
frustrate specific policy objectives of the federal legislation." Yet while one of
ERISA's goals is efficiency of administration, and while Egelhoff expressly
notes that requiring an employer to learn the laws of all fifty states is contrary
to that goal,83 some courts, in cases where traditional revocation-by-divorce
principles would otherwise apply, have pulled federal common law principles
directly from the states of the circuit in which they sit. Unfortunately, "[s]uch
an approach presents the same obstacles to national uniformity that ERISA
preemption was designed to prevent, requiring plan administrators to deter-
mine complex choice-of-law questions, and then to interpret and apply
varying state laws."85 Quite plainly, federal common law should not be a
backdoor vehicle for implementing state law.
The Sixth Circuit refuses to develop federal common law to address the
issues stemming from ERISA preemption of traditional revocation-by-divorce
statutes, and it has thereby created a circuit split.8 6 The Sixth Circuit caused
the rift by holding that ERISA section 1104(a)(1)(D) not only requires that
plan proceeds be paid directly to the designated beneficiary but it furthermore
bars any inconsistent federal common law permitting broader inquiry.87 The
court's view considers state revocation-by-divorce statutes to be in direct con-
flict with ERISA section 1104(a)(1)(D). 8 The Sixth Circuit is alone in this
construction. s9
Some respond to this splintered jurisprudence by proposing that federal
common law should incorporate the Restatements or UPC, which generally
reflect a conglomeration of the majority views in state law.9° As one commen-
81. Waterfowl Ltd. Liab. Co. v. United States, 473 F.3d 135, 143-44 (5th Cir. 2006).
82. New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201,207 (2d Cir. 2006).
83. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50.
84. See Tinsley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000) (relying on law
drawn from the states comprising its circuit to develop federal common law regarding forgery and
undue influence in the designation of beneficiaries in a dispute over ERISA plan proceeds); Clift v.
Clift, 210 E3d 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting the practice of several federal circuits using state
law to develop federal common law in disputes between a designated ex-spouse beneficiary and
other claimants to ERISA plan proceeds).
85. Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721,726-27 (Tex. 2003).
86. For a discussion of the split, see Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 2000). The
court notes that "[a] majority of the circuit courts to have considered the issue have recognized that
ERISA does not expressly address the circumstances, if any, in which a non-beneficiary may avoid
the payment of life insurance benefits to the named beneficiary" and thus "these courts have held
that the issue is governed by federal common law." Id. at 870-71 (citing Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268,
269-71 (5th Cir. 2000), and Hill v. AT&T Corp., 125 F.3d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1997)).
87. McMillan v. Parrott, 913 E2d 310, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1996) (unenthusiastically noting that McMillan dictated the
disposition of the case and that the panel was "not free to reject it in favor of some other approach").
88. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Glover, 10 F. Supp. 2d 762, 765 (E.D.
Mich. 1998); In re Estate of MacAnally, 20 P.3d 1197, 1203 (Colo. App. 2000).
89. Manning, 212 F.3d at 871 ("The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to unambiguously em-
ploy this minority approach.").
90. Lebolt, supra note 29 (arguing federal common law should be created from the Restate-
ment and supplemented by the UPC where the Restatement is silent).
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tator explains, creating federal common law from the Restatement "(1) is in-
tent-enforcing, furthering one of the primary purposes of ERISA itself[-]the
protection of the interests of plan participants and their rightful beneficiaries;
and (2) provides uniformity, thereby effectuating the overarching purpose of
ERISA preemption." 9' A federal common law incorporating the Restatement
and UPC would reflect a traditional revocation-by-divorce doctrine whereby
divorce would automatically revoke an ex-spouse's claim to ERISA plan pro-
ceeds if the beneficiary designation was created prior to the divorce.92
Although use of the Restatement or UPC would likely solve the problem of
uniformity regarding the revocation-by-divorce doctrine, no court has yet
adopted this approach.
B. Amendment of ERISA: Little Hope of Congressional Action
A simple, and perhaps ideal, solution to the problems arising from ERISA
preemption is for Congress to amend ERISA to explicitly authorize applica-
tion of the traditional revocation-by-divorce doctrine. In fact, some have
expressly argued that "Congress should allow states to apply [revocation-by-
divorce] statutes to ERISA plans and not require that transfers under ERISA
plans be treated differently from all other transfers at death."93 Congress could
also simply rewrite ERISA itself to contain a traditional revocation-by-divorce
provision, thereby preempting any state law to the contrary. No doubt con-
gressional amendment of ERISA would be the most straightforward solution.
If Congress took action to amend ERISA, the courts would have an unambi-
guous authority for applying the revocation-by-divorce principle to cases
involving ex-spouses and other claimants to ERISA-governed employee bene-
fit plan proceeds.
Unfortunately, Congress has shown no interest in solving the problems• 94
surrounding ERISA preemption. For example, ERISA's "relate to" provision
91. Id. at 30.
92. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 2007); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. p (1999). While using
the Restatement or the UPC as federal common law would be uniform, it may not be a genuine
reflection of the contemporary nationwide view on the revocation-by-divorce doctrine. Gallanis,
supra note 62, at 196 (noting that using the UPC and Restatements to mold federal common law
regarding the revocation-by-divorce doctrine, "although elegant, requires an important caveat [be-
cause] ... [t]he substantive rules articulated by the Restatement Third and the UPC sometimes
reflect minority, rather than widely-accepted, positions").
93. Gary, supra note 12, at 126. To achieve this result, Congress could add a probate provi-
sion similar to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") exception for divorce. ERISA
preempts "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (2000). While "this language apparently would include claims based on
divorce decrees issued by state courts, subsection (b)(7) explains the preemption clause 'shall not
apply to qualified domestic relations orders.'" Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1119
(10th Cir. 1991) (quoting § I 144(b)(7)).
94. Gallanis, supra note 62, at 195-96. Many recent Supreme Court cases interpret ERISA's
preemption provision. See, e.g., Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334 (2003)
(holding that generally applied state laws having some effect on insurers do not fall within the insur-
ance exception to ERISA preemption); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373
(2002) (holding a state statute requiring HMOs to provide independent review of disputes between
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preempts state claims for wrongful denial of medical care under employer-
provided health insurance, including common law actions such as breach of
contract, wrongful death, and malpractice. 95 ERISA therefore mandates an
exclusively federal remedy.96 But this has left some injured patients with no
apparent claim against qualified health care insurers for refusal of care.97 Since
the late 1980s, Congress has known about the issue9" but has failed to amend
ERISA accordingly,9 despite the urging of the Supreme Court,' °° lower
courts,'0 ' and several commentators.'0 2 Given Congress' reluctance to amend
primary care physicians and HMOs was not preempted by ERISA); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding a state wage law
is not preempted by ERISA); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841
(1988) (holding ERISA preempts a state statute prohibiting wage garnishment under an ERISA-
governed plan); see also Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CR1. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1988) (observing ERISA's expan-
sive preemption "has wreaked aimless interference upon state regulation of areas such as health
insurance that are quite peripheral to pension policy" and that "[n]either a substantial string of Su-
preme Court cases nor occasional Congressional repair has been able to cure the mess").
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
96. Id.
97. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 1997). In
Andrews-Clarke, a plan participant sued the plan administrators for the wrongful death of her alco-
holic husband who had been refused entry to a rehabilitation program even though the plan did
allow for such a program. Id. at 51-52. Failure to receive treatment caused the husband to commit
suicide. Id. The court found that ERISA preempted the participant's cause of action and therefore
left her without damages. Id. at 53. The court's opinion condemns Congress' failure to amend
ERISA, contending that the outcome of Andrews-Clarke is "yet another illustration of the glaring
need for Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the modem health care
system." Id. (footnote omitted). The court observes the increased difficulty for Congress to correct
flawed statutes such as ERISA than to pass them "in the first place .... because interests coalesce
around the advantageous aspects of the status quo." Id. at 64-65 (omission in original) (quoting
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failure of Textualism, 33 HAR. J. LEoIS. 35, 99 (1996)).
98. For example, Congress unsuccessfully tried encouraging the development of federal
common law to remedy ERISA's shortcomings. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 55-56 (1989) (detail-
ing the Budget Committee conclusion that the legislative history of ERISA showed Congress
wanted courts, through federal common law, to develop "appropriate remedies, even if they are not
specifically enumerated in section 502 of ERISA," for improper medical claims processing by in-
surance groups), as reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1948.
99. The unenacted Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2004 proposed to, among other things,
amend ERISA by introducing a cause of action against health plan fiduciaries for "fail[ure] to exer-
cise ordinary care in making a decision" to refuse care to a patient. H.R. 4628, 108TH CONG. § 402
(2004).
100. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(supporting the "rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust
and increasingly tangled ERISA regime" (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 E3d 442,
453 (3d Cir. 2003))).
101. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part)
("[T]he injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be healed until the Supreme Court recon-
siders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress revisits the law to the
same end."), vacated sub nom., Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 124 S. Ct. 2902 (2004); Andrews-Clarke,
984 F. Supp. at 53 (urging amendment to ERISA to eliminate self-insured distinction regarding
medical insurance so as to allow more stringent review of medical claims).
102. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, ERISA's Preemption Ruling Prevents a Patient frm Suing
an HMO Under State Malpractice Law: After Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila Who Will Grant the
Working Middle Class a Meaningful Right to Be Heard?, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 715, 745
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ERISA to create a refusal of medical care cause of action, even under heavy
judicial and public pressure, the likelihood that Congress will amend ERISA
in the near future with respect to the revocation-by-divorce preemption issue
is slim.
C. Reform of the Plan Documents:
Too Difficult to Facilitate National Change
Perhaps the most basic solution to the issue surrounding ex-spouses des-
ignated as beneficiaries in ERISA plans is for the administrators themselves
to update the plan documents to include a revocation-by-divorce clause. By
encouraging employers to alter their policies, the updated documents would
best reflect the likely intent of divorced decedents and would achieve
ERISA's goal of protecting plan participants." 3
Nonetheless, the practical implications of facilitating a change in all
U.S. employers' ERISA plans are overwhelming. There are not nearly
enough administrative resources to ensure every employer updates its plan
documents or enough employer resources to enforce such an expansive pro-
ject. Moreover, ERISA itself requires plan administrators to conform to the
terms of the plan documents "insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with" ERISA.' °4 If plan administrators must investigate whether
every plan participant is divorced and whether the plan document lists the
participant's ex-spouse as the primary beneficiary, the new plan provision
could thwart ERISA's goal of ease of administration.'0 5
III. APPLYING STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS TO ERISA-GOVERNED
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS ENSURES AN EQUITABLE RESULT
This Part argues that state statutory constructive trusts are a viable tool
to resolve the problem of ERISA-preempted state revocation-by-divorce
statutes. Section III.A asserts that constructive trusts adequately realign the
treatment of ERISA-governed employee benefit plans with that of wills and
all other will substitutes, because courts often use constructive trusts in cir-
cumstances of unjust enrichment-a result that is exactly what the
revocation-by-divorce doctrine is designed to prevent. Section III.A further
argues that, in order to maximize efficiency and avoid excessive litigation
costs, the constructive trust doctrine should be codified in state statutes.
Section III.B contends that, once codified, these state constructive trust stat-
utes will not be preempted by ERISA, because such statutes neither directly
(2005) (urging passage of Patients' Bill of Rights Act to "wipe out the vast regulatory vacuum cre-
ated by ERISA's ... preemption rationales"); Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and
Patients' Rights in the Wake of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1070-75
(2005) (urging passage of federal legislation providing patients with the right to independent medi-
cal review).
103. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 77-87.
104. 29 U.S.C. § I I04(a)(l)(D) (2000).
105. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2001).
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interfere with ERISA nor hinder its goals. Finally, Section III.C maintains
that the constructive trust doctrine currently represents the most realistic
resolution to ERISA preemption of state revocation-by-divorce statutes, be-
cause it achieves equal treatment of ERISA-govemed plans and all other
will substitutes and at the same time accomplishes ERISA's goals of admin-
istrative efficiency and protection of plan participants.
A. The Constructive Trust Doctrine Seamlessly Applies to
ERISA -Governed Employee Benefit Plans
This Section asserts that constructive trusts may be appropriately applied
to ERISA-governed plan proceeds if equity so demands. It further argues
that codified constructive trusts represent the most efficient way to achieve
such equitable results. The constructive trust doctrine is an equitable doc-
trine that courts employ in cases of unjust enrichment. According to the
Restatement, a constructive trust relationship exposes "the person by whom
the title is held to an equitable duty to convey the property to another on the
ground that the title holder's acquisition or retention of the property is
wrongful and that unjust enrichment would occur if the title holder were
permitted to retain the property."' 6 For example, a court may impose a con-
structive trust upon "an innocent donee of property in which another has an
equitable interest."'' 7
Issuing ERISA plan proceeds to a decedent's ex-spouse as the desig-
nated beneficiary may constitute unjust enrichment.' 8 If, upon factual
analysis of the circumstances, a court determines that the ex-spouse received
his or her fair share in the divorce and that the decedent likely did not intend
for the ex-spouse to receive the ERISA plan proceeds, the court should have
the discretion to impose an equitable constructive trust on the assets in favor
of other claimants to the proceeds.' 9 These claimants may be the secondary
beneficiaries listed on the plan documents or the decedent's heirs who
would take under intestacy."0 Under the constructive trust doctrine, the plan
administrator would pay the benefit plan proceeds to the designated benefi-
ciary-the ex-spouse-as required by ERISA."' While the ex-spouse would
have legal title to the plan proceeds according to the plan documents, a court
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1, cmt. e (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. d (1937); Dickinson, supra note 17, at 569 n.119 (explaining that "[tihis
formulation has been widely adopted" and providing a list of case law discussing the formulation).
107. ScoT-r & FRATCHER, supra note 18, § 462; see also supra notes 13-18 and accompany-
ing text.
108. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that by preempting a state
revocation-by-divorce statute, "the Court permits a divorced wife, who already acquired, during the
divorce proceeding, her fair share of the couple's community property, to receive in addition the
benefits that the divorce court awarded to her former husband"); see also Gary, supra note 12, at
121.
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could determine that he or she did not have equitable title.' 12 The court could
then order the ex-spouse, as an equitable trustee, to deliver the proceeds to
other claimants by imposing the constructive trust."3
An equitable constructive trust entered against an ex-spouse in effect al-
lows courts to reach the same result they would have reached had ERISA
not preempted state revocation-by-divorce statutes. ERISA does not preempt
the application of constructive trusts," 4 because constructive trusts are a ju-
dicial equitable remedy."' A few courts have considered the application of
the constructive trust doctrine as a judicial intervention in cases regarding
beneficial interests in an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan, and most
have allowed the claims of would-be beneficiaries seeking assets from an
116
ex-spouse.
While ERISA does not preempt the use of constructive trusts as a judi-
cially imposed equitable remedy, constructive trusts should be codified into
state law in order to reduce litigation costs." 7 The constructive trust doctrine
is historically a judicial remedy, but UPC section 2-804(h)(2) codifies the
doctrine to resurrect its revocation-by-divorce provision if that provision is
subsequently preempted by federal law."' While currently "[a] court can tailor
its decision to the situation" and arrive at an equitable result using the judicial
constructive trust remedy, litigation is required "to resolve the [factual] ques-
tion of who has an equitable right to the proceeds.' '9 In each dispute, if a
court chooses to use the constructive trust as an equitable judicial solution, it
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (providing that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by the stat-
ute]" (emphasis added)).
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1, cmt. e (2003) ("A constructive trust is ... the
result of judicial intervention and is remedial in character.").
116. See Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting "the
imposition of a constructive trust on insurance proceeds before their distribution to the designated
beneficiary"); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mulligan, 210 F. Supp. 2d 894 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (agreeing
with the ex-spouse that ERISA preempted the state revocation-by-divorce statute but denying the ex-
spouse summary judgment because of a constructive trust claim brought by the decedent's children);
Kmatz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:04-CV-436, 2006 WL 1209362 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 2006)
(recognizing a constructive trust claim but ultimately rejecting such claim because under Ohio law
no unjust enrichment occurred). But see Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2003)
(broadly refusing a constructive trust claim against a second ex-spouse where the first marriage's
divorce decree ordered the decedent to list his child from his first marriage as beneficiary, because
"ERISA preempts Illinois state law with respect to determining the rightful beneficiary" of an
ERISA-govemed insurance policy).
117. For a discussion of why codified constructive trusts are not preempted by ERISA, see
infra Section III.B.
118. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. For examples of codification of judicial
equitable remedies, see 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000), which codifies equitable injunctive relief in patent
rights cases, and U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000), which codifies the equitable doctrine of unconscionability
in contracts cases.
119. Gary, supra note 12, at 123.
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must first examine the decedent's likely intent and establish whether the
divorce proceedings arrived at a fair division of assets. '2°
Codifying constructive trusts with respect to the revocation-by-divorce
doctrine eliminates the need for such an in-depth, fact-based inquiry and
thus reduces the costs of litigation." ' Absent evidence that the decedent did
in fact wish for the ex-spouse to receive the proceeds, the court may pre-
sume the decedent's intent was to withhold the proceeds from the ex-spouse,
much like traditional revocation-by-divorce statutes presume a decedent's
intent with respect to wills and all other will substitutes. The burden
would be on the ex-spouse to produce contrary evidence-for example, by
showing the decedent re-executed the beneficiary designation or by showing
an agreement between the decedent and the ex-spouse providing for such an
arrangement.
B. State Constructive Trust Statutes Are Not Preempted by ERISA
UPC section 2-804, including its constructive trust provision, has been
123124adopted in some states, ' and, although yet to be tested in any court, such
statutes will likely escape preemption by ERISA. Because ERISA requires
only that a plan be administered "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan, 1 2' a constructive trust statute affecting plan
proceeds after payment to a plan-designated ex-spouse would not directly
120. Id. at 121.
121. Because ERISA-governed employee benefit plans traditionally provide for periodic
payments, however, a court might encounter practical difficulties when enforcing a constructive trust
against an ex-spouse, thereby increasing litigation costs. The ex-spouse may attempt to block a
victorious claimant's access to the proceeds as the plan administrator makes each payment over
time. A successful claimant, however, may be able to thwart the ex-spouse's evasion through gar-
nishment or other court-ordered remedy. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 974 (6th
Cir. 2006) (finding that once a pension plan administrator sends benefit payments to a beneficiary
and relinquishes control of the payments, the attachment of those funds by a creditor does not con-
stitute an impermissible alienation prohibited by ERISA); Hoult v. Hoult, 373 E3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.
2004) (affirming a lower court's deposit order requiring a beneficiary to place ERISA proceeds in a
bank account for the benefit of his daughter-creditor); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that immediate garnishment of proceeds at
the moment of payment did not contradict a previous Supreme Court decision barring imposition of
a constructive trust on an ERISA plan administrator). But see United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681,
682-84 (4th Cir. 1995) (barring alienation of postretirement annuity payments after distribution to
the beneficiary, but not if the proceeds are preretirement lump sum payments). The court itself may
use its contempt power to ensure an ex-spouse follows its constructive trust order. See Jones v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 57 E Supp. 2d 1224. 1239-40 (D. Wyo. 1999) ("[T]here is a possibility that [a party]
may choose to enforce the constructive trust by means of a contempt proceeding or other action.");
Petersen v. Vallenzano, 858 F.Supp. 40, 40-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding a debtor in contempt for
failure to comply with a constructive trust order). Unfortunately, depending on how determined the
ex-spouse is, there could be continued conflict over a decedent's ERISA plan proceeds.
122. See Gary, supra note 12, at 84.
123. See supra note 25.
124. Gary, supra note 12, at 124. A recent Westlaw Keycite of state statutes that adopt UPC
section 2-804 confirms this assertion.
125. 29 U.S.C. § I104(a)(l)(D) (2000).
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conflict with ERISA. 1 6 As one court explained, "once the benefits of an
ERISA employee welfare benefit plan have been distributed according to the
plan documents, ERISA does not preempt the imposition of a constructive
trust on those benefits."'27 Because statutory constructive trusts alleviate
concerns regarding the burden on administrators and the interests of plan
participants, such state statutes are in line with the spirit of the Egelhoffrul-
ing. 12 Furthermore, state statutory constructive trusts are consistent with the
blackletter law of the Egelhoff ruling, because such trusts would not be in-
validated by ERISA's "relate to" preemption analysis set forth by the
Court." 9 Such state statutes do not make reference to an ERISA plan, and
they are not impermissibly "connected with" ERISA. Statutory constructive
trusts are not used as an end run around ERISA and Egelhoff. instead, they
ensure the goals of ERISA are met and Egelhoff s ruling is honored while
achieving the equitable realization of the decedent's most likely intent.
ERISA's preemption provision states that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan" governed by ERISA.' 3" The Egelhoff Court explained
that "relate to" preemption is clearly expansive but "cannot be taken to ex-
tend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy."' 3 ' The Court elaborated that
a state law is preempted by ERISA's "relate to" language if it has a connec-
tion with, or reference to, an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.'
32
A statute makes "reference to" ERISA plans if it acts exclusively on
such plans or if the existence of ERISA is essential to the statute's opera-
tion. 3  The Egelhoff Court accepted that traditional revocation-by-divorce
statutes do not make "reference to" ERISA plans.'3 4 Similarly, a constructive
trust statute fashioned after UPC section 2-804(h)(2) would not reference
126. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48, 150 (2001) (stating that a
traditional revocation-by-divorce statute directly conflicts with ERISA because such a state statute
requires an administrator issue plan proceeds to someone other than the listed beneficiary on the
plan documents). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA's anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1), coupled with ERISA's protection of surviving spouses, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, directly
conflicts with a state law allowing a nonparticipant ex-spouse to transfer by testamentary instrument
a community-property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits where the remarried deceased
plan participant is survived by his subsequent spouse. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). This
Note focuses more broadly on the circumstances arising when the would-be beneficiary of a dece-
dent's ERISA-govemed employee benefit plan may not be a surviving spouse.
127. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 678-79 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding courts have "discretion to impose a constructive trust upon those benefits in accor-
dance with applicable state law if equity so requires").
128. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50.
129. See id. at 146-52.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
131. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 147.
133. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
134. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
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ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.' Such a statute acts on any fed-
eral law, not solely ERISA, and operates notwithstanding the existence of
ERISA. 36
A court determines whether a statute has a "connection with" ERISA by
consulting (i) the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans in
light of (ii) the objectives of ERISA.137 The Egelhoff Court focused on
whether a traditional revocation-by-divorce statute had an impermissible
"connection with" ERISA-governed plans and concluded that ERISA pre-
empted such a statute because it ran counter to the "central matter of plan
administration"-that proceeds are paid to the individual listed as benefici-
ary and because it interfered with the principal ERISA goals of
nationally uniform and efficient plan administration. 139
Unlike revocation-by-divorce statutes, state statutory constructive trusts
would have minimal effect on ERISA plans, because ERISA involvement
terminates upon payment of the plan proceeds.' 4 The Supreme Court has
upheld generally applicable laws "where ERISA has nothing to say,"' 4' that
is, where state statutes do not make "reference to" ERISA plans, "notwith-
standing their incidental effect on ERISA plans.' 42 The traditional
revocation-by-divorce statute in Egelhoff directly affected the beneficiary
payment of proceeds required by the plan documents: it bound plan admin-
istrators to research whether a decedent was divorced and, if so, to issue
payment to someone other than the ex-spouse beneficiary prescribed by the
governing instrument. A statutory constructive trust, however, would not
interfere with plan administration. Only after the administrator paid out pro-
ceeds to the designated ex-spouse beneficiary would a judge impose any
necessary constructive trust.' 44 Thus the "nature of the effect" of a state
135. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 2007).
136. See id. UPC section 2-804(h)(2) provides as follows:
If... any part of this section [2-804] is preempted by federal law with respect to ... any ...
benefit covered by this section, a former spouse.., who, not for value, received a payment...
to which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return that payment.., to
the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not pre-
empted.
Id. (emphasis added). For example, section 2-804(h)(2) also applies to the federal regulations relat-
ing to United States Treasury bills held in the name of the decedent and the ex-spouse by right of
survivorship. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 6, at 10-24 to 10-25.
137. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
138. Id. at 147-48.
139. Id. at 148-50.
140. Pardee v. Pers. Representative for Estate of Pardee, 112 P.3d 308, 314 (Okla. Civ. App.
2004) ("The prevailing view is that ERISA does not protect pension funds after the beneficiary
receives the funds.").
141. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dilling-
ham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997)).
142. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 2007).
[Vol. 106:373
Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves
statutory constructive trust on ERISA-governed employee benefit plans
would be negligible.
Statutory constructive trusts also protect ERISA's objectives by respect-
ing the interests of plan participants.4 First, much like the rationale for the
revocation-by-divorce doctrine, the judiciary can use constructive trusts to
recognize an expression of the decedent's presumed intent. The state con-
structive trust statute assumes that most divorced plan participants would
prefer courts deny an ex-spouse property issued according to a beneficiary
designation instrument that the decedent executed before the couple di-
vorced.46 Second, use of constructive trusts protects the interests of a plan
participant's dependents-for example, by recognizing that the needs of a
surviving spouse and children from a decedent's second marriage should
trump the designation of an ex-spouse on a beneficiary form.
47
Likewise, state statutory constructive trusts are consistent with ERISA's
objectives of uniform and efficient plan administration. ERISA section
1 104(a)(1)(D) requires that an employer administer a plan "in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan.' ' 48 The Egelhoff
Court was concerned with the ease of administration of ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans, and the Court ruled conclusively that plan adminis-
trators should be able to rely on the plan documents with no obligation to
check state laws in determining the beneficiary to a plan. 49 The constructive
trust doctrine would not block this right of employers: employers would still
efficiently and uniformly distribute the plan proceeds to the designated
beneficiaries, with no additional responsibilities. A court could then impose
a statutory constructive trust without undermining ERISA or its goals.'50
C. Constructive Trusts are Superior to Other Suggested Solutions
to the ERISA Preemption Problem
Because ERISA's broad "relate to" provision likely would not preempt
state constructive trust statutes, the imposition of statutory constructive
trusts is preferable to the other suggested solutions to ERISA preemption of
state revocation-by-divorce statutes. First, as noted in Part II, the creation of
145. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 77-87.
146. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 60.
147. See Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting "the
imposition of a constructive trust on insurance proceeds after their distribution to the designated
beneficiary"); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mulligan, 210 F. Supp. 2d 894 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (agreeing
with the ex-spouse that the state revocation-by-divorce statute was preempted by ERISA but denying
the ex-spouse summary judgment because of an equitable constructive trust claim brought by the
decedent's children).
148. 29 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(l)(D) (2000).
149. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50.
150. See Pardee v. Pers. Representative for Estate of Pardee, 112 P.3d 308, 313 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2004) (noting postdistribution funds do not raise the same ERISA-related administrative bur-
den concerns as predistribution funds); see also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150 n.3 (noting the burden
placed on an administrator if it must retain plan proceeds while claimants resolve a dispute in court).
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federal common law is troubled by concerns regarding efficient plan ad-
ministration, and this gave rise to a circuit split. ' State constructive trust
statutes would provide a means for the courts to avoid such debate alto-
gether. The use of constructive trusts conforms to the Sixth Circuit's
approach that plan administrators must always pay proceeds directly to a
designated beneficiary.12 State statutory constructive trusts, however, would
also allow courts that favor creating federal common law to reach an equita-
ble result by applying the state constructive trust statutes of the jurisdiction
in which they sit. Courts in favor of using federal common law may eventu-
ally adopt the revocation-by-divorce provisions of the UPC or Restatements
as a uniform nationwide rule of law. Until that time, however, state construc-
tive trust statutes represent an alternative tool that courts may use to achieve
equity in revocation-by-divorce cases involving ERISA-governed employee
benefit plans.53
Notwithstanding the constructive trust doctrine's amenability to the
various courts' views on federal common law, the issue need never be
raised. Because ERISA does not preempt state constructive trust statutes,
there is no need for any court to address the application of federal common
law at all. Rather, each jurisdiction may freely apply the state statute to the
circumstances of each case. These statutes would not force plan administra-
tors to investigate the diverse federal common law of the many American
jurisdictions. Nor would these statutes require an employer to change its
administration based on a hodgepodge of law: the employer would instead
be able to follow solely the plain language of the plan documents.
Statutory constructive trusts are preferable to the other two alternative
strategies. Given the slim chance of congressional action to amend ERISA,
constructive trust statutes would give states a tool to deal with the problem
on their own. And, while employers may be resistant to altering the plan
documents themselves, the use of constructive trusts would allow adminis-
trators to continue to efficiently pay out proceeds according to the existing,
standard language of the plan document. Further, rewriting the plan docu-
ments would place a significant burden on employers, because they would
then have to conduct a factual inquiry into a decedent's marital status and
beneficiary listing before issuing plan proceeds. Constructive trusts allow
employers to continue to enjoy ease of administration with no additional
responsibility.
151. See supra Section H.A.
152. See McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990).
153. Constructive trust statutes will result in higher litigation costs than the uniform adoption
of federal common law because of the expense of separate lawsuits against ex-spouses, but it will
take many judicial opinions across jurisdictions to definitively adopt the Restatement or UPC as
federal common law. Even then, disagreements on interpretation of the Restatement and UPC provi-
sions could ensue. Given the jumbled state of the law, state constructive trusts represent a practical
approach that courts could immediately embrace.
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CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court's ruling in Egelhoff, constructive trusts repre-
sent a viable mechanism for realigning ERISA-governed employee benefit
plans with the treatment of wills and other will substitutes. Constructive
trusts remedy unjust enrichment, which the traditional revocation-by-
divorce doctrine is designed to prevent. In order to be most effective and
avoid excessive litigation costs, state legislatures should codify the construc-
tive trust doctrine, preferably using the UPC as a model. Once codified,
state constructive trust statutes likely will not be preempted by ERISA's "re-
late to" provision, because such statutes do not directly interfere with
ERISA or hinder its goals. Furthermore, of all the suggested solutions to
ERISA preemption of state revocation-by-divorce statutes, the constructive
trust doctrine represents a true resolution, because it achieves equal treat-
ment of ERISA-govemed plans and all other will substitutes yet also
accomplishes ERISA's goals of administrative efficiency and protection of
plan participants.
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